Much of the appeal of deliberative democracy lies in its emancipatory promise to give otherwise disadvantaged groups a voice, and to grant them influence through reasoned argument. However, the precise mechanisms for delivery of this promise remain obscure. After reviewing Habermas's formulation of deliberation, the article draws on recent theories of argumentation to provide a more detailed account of such mechanisms. The article identifies the key emancipatory mechanism as explicitness in language. It outlines the primary modalities of this mechanism: expressing (...) differences of opinion, mobilising a shared standard of inference, and recognising and excluding fallacious appeals to irrelevant factors such as force or authority. It describes how these modalities are enhanced at a secondary, reflexive level that recognises the partiality and defeasibility of particular argumentative exchanges. Such qualifications, it is argued, support a model of deliberation across discourses that allows a clearer appreciation of its potential and limits. (shrink)

This paper examines the properties of the validity and scope of arguments as standards for evaluating the epistemic qualities of particular deliberative exchanges within a context of value pluralism where parties can hold differing views of the common good based on incommensurable basic values. In this context, the task of political decisions is to maximise the interests of all, only judging between internally coherent versions of the common good on the basis of their mutual impact. The paper argues open, democratic, (...) deliberation provides the best chance of discovering such a path, through developing mutual understanding across incommensurable positions. Identifying the validity and scope of a deliberative exchange enhances this potential. Any deliberative exchange may be characterised in terms of its validity – the reasons that support its conclusions – and scope – the unquestioned assumptions that mark the boundaries of that reasoning. The paper explains the epistemic role of these two features in developing understanding across plural positions. Clarity about the validity of an exchange reveals positions that can be shared. Acknowledgement of its scope avoids over-extending its conclusions and reveals how positions differ, providing the starting point for further deliberation about their co-ordination. The paper ends by drawing the conclusion that deliberation characterised in this way should be democratic and open. (shrink)

Recent work in the strategic-relational approach to explaining the relationship between structure and agency emphasises the significance of ideas, discourses, and the semiotic realm of symbols. However, this work does not yet offer an explanation of how discourses relate to symbols – how texts take on meaning. This article shows why this is needed. It then provides such an account of language use and learning in explicitly strategic-relational terms. That account both grounds strategic-relational concepts of discourse, and helps define them (...) more clearly. While complementing and strengthening such notions, it also provides an insight into the way particular discourses interrelate. In particular, the model presented here suggests the importance of the constructive and critical potential of reason, in enlarging the scope for critical syntheses across discourses, and guarding against hegemony. (shrink)

The term ‘breeding system’ is used to describe the morphological and behavioural aspects of the sexual life cycle of a species. The yeast breeding system provides three alternatives that enable hapoids to return to the diploid state that is necessary for meiosis: mating of unrelated haploids (amphimixis), mating between spores from the same tetrad (intratetrad mating, automixis) and mother daughter mating upon mating type switching (haplo‐selfing). The frequency of specific mating events affects the level of heterozygosity present in individuals and (...) the genetic diversity of populations. This review discuses the reproductive strategies of yeasts, in particular S. cerevisiae (Bakers' or budding yeast). Emphasis is put on intratetrad mating, its implication for diversity, and how the particular genome structure could have evolved to ensure the preservation of a high degree of heterozygosity in conjunction with frequent intratetrad matings. I also discuss how the ability of yeast to control the number of spores that are formed accounts for high intratetrad mating rates and for enhanced transmission of genomic variation. I extend the discussion to natural genetic variation and propose that a high level of plasticity is inherent in the yeast breeding system, which may allow variation of the breeding behaviour in accordance with the needs imposed by the environment. BioEssays 28: 696–708, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Interpretive political science focuses on the meanings that shape actions and institutions, and the ways in which they do so. This Handbook explores the implications of interpretive theory for the study of politics. It provides the first definitive survey of the field edited by two of its pioneers. This Handbook is an invaluable resource for students, scholars and practitioners in the areas of international relations, comparative politics, political sociology, political psychology and public administration.

In 2004 Atserias, Kolaitis, and Vardi proposed $\text {OBDD}$ -based propositional proof systems that prove unsatisfiability of a CNF formula by deduction of an identically false $\text {OBDD}$ from $\text {OBDD}$ s representing clauses of the initial formula. All $\text {OBDD}$ s in such proofs have the same order of variables. We initiate the study of $\text {OBDD}$ based proof systems that additionally contain a rule that allows changing the order in $\text {OBDD}$ s. At first we consider a proof (...) system $\text {OBDD}$ that uses the conjunction rule and the rule that allows changing the order. We exponentially separate this proof system from $\text {OBDD}$ proof system that uses only the conjunction rule. We prove exponential lower bounds on the size of $\text {OBDD}$ refutations of Tseitin formulas and the pigeonhole principle. The first lower bound was previously unknown even for $\text {OBDD}$ proofs and the second one extends the result of Tveretina et al. from $\text {OBDD}$ to $\text {OBDD}$.In 2001 Aguirre and Vardi proposed an approach to the propositional satisfiability problem based on $\text {OBDD}$ s and symbolic quantifier elimination $ algorithms). We augment these algorithms with the operation of reordering of variables and call the new scheme $\text {OBDD}$ algorithms. We notice that there exists an $\text {OBDD}$ algorithm that solves satisfiable and unsatisfiable Tseitin formulas in polynomial time, but we show that there are formulas representing systems of linear equations over $\mathbb {F}_2$ that are hard for $\text {OBDD}$ algorithms. Our hard instances are satisfiable formulas representing systems of linear equations over $\mathbb {F}_2$ that correspond to checksum matrices of error correcting codes. (shrink)

This paper adopts a pragma-dialectic approach to explore inclusion in real-world argumentation. Having outlined theories of deliberative democracy—focussing on Habermas’s discourse model—and pragma-dialectic methods for analysing argumentative exchanges in the real world, we then relate them. From this we identify the potential for using the enhanced detail of pragma-dialectic analysis to constructively understand dynamics of inclusion in the political decision processes of central concern to deliberative democratic theories.In the remainder of the article we illustrate this potential with our own pragma-dialectic (...) analysis of an instance of real-world argumentation in a political policymaking process—a deliberative forum in the contentious field of mental health. The detail afforded by the pragma-dialectic method allows us to more clearly identify the complex layers and dynamics of argument involved in these policy deliberations, allowing insights into mechanisms for inclusion in deliberations, relative to the parties to such deliberations, their roles and competing interests and perspectives.By relating the two fields of deliberative democratic theory and pragma-dialectics this article aims to develop their complementary potential—in particular by suggesting, and briefly illustrating—how pragma-dialectic methods might enhance analysis of the dynamics of argumentation in political policymaking processes, in particular as an aid to constructive reflection on those processes by theorists and participants together. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theorists aim to justify Bayesian norms by arguing that these norms further the goal of epistemic accuracy—having beliefs that are as close as possible to the truth. The standard defense of Probabilism appeals to accuracy dominance: for every belief state that violates the probability calculus, there is some probabilistic belief state that is more accurate, come what may. The standard defense of Conditionalization, on the other hand, appeals to expected accuracy: before the evidence is in, one should expect (...) to do better by conditionalizing than by following any other rule. We present a new argument for Conditionalization that appeals to accuracy‐dominance, rather than expected accuracy. Our argument suggests that Conditionalization is a rule of coherence: plans that conflict with Conditionalization don't just prescribe bad responses to the evidence; they also give rise to inconsistent attitudes. (shrink)

Part of the Studies in Crime and Public Policy series, this book, written by one of the top philosophers of punishment, examines the main trends in penal theorizing over the past three decades. Duff asks what can justify criminal punishment, and then explores the legitimacy of actual practices by examining what would count as adequate justification for them. Duff argues that a "communicative conception of punishment," which he presents as a third way between consequentialist and retributive theories, offers the most (...) fruitful way of understanding punishment's meaning and justification. Duff addresses such questions as how much sentences should be constrained by proportionality requirements; what modalities of punishment best communicate their intended meaning; and what decisionmaking procedures he envisions. This book will appeal to criminologists, philosophers, and others interested in theories of punishment. (shrink)

I begin by discussing the ways in which a would-be blamer's own prior conduct towards the person he seeks to blame can undermine his standing to blame her. This provides the basis for an examination of a particular kind of 'bar to trial' in the criminal law – of ways in which a state or a polity's right to put a defendant on trial can be undermined by the prior misconduct of the state or its officials. The examination of this (...) often neglected legal phenomenon illuminates some central features of the criminal law and the criminal process, and some of the preconditions for the legitimacy of the criminal law in a liberal republic. (shrink)

How can a system of criminal punishment be justified? In particular can it be justified if the moral demand that we respect each other as autonomous moral agents is taken seriously? Traditional attempts to justify punishment as a deterrent or as retribution fail, but Duff suggests that punishment can be understood as a communicative attempt to bring a wrong-doer to repent her crime. This account is supported by discussions of moral blame, of penance, of the nature of the law's demands, (...) and of the proper meaning and purpose of the criminal process of trial and verdict: it deals both with the ideals that should inform a system of criminal law and the extent to which those ideals are actualised in existing institutions and practices. The conclusion is pessimistic: punishment cannot be justified within our legal system; and this gap between the ideal and the actual presents us with serious moral dilemmas. (shrink)

After distinguishing different species of Legal Moralism I outline and defend a modest, positive Legal Moralism, according to which we have good reason to criminalize some type of conduct if it constitutes a public wrong. Some of the central elements of the argument will be: the need to remember that the criminal law is a political, not a moral practice, and therefore that in asking what kinds of conduct we have good reason to criminalize, we must begin not with the (...) entire realm of wrongdoing, but with conduct falling within the public realm of our civic life; the need to look at the different processes of criminalization, and to ask what kinds of consideration can properly figure in those processes; the need to attend to the relationship, and the essential differences, between criminal law and other modes of legal regulation. (shrink)

'Most of us are still groping for answers about what makes life worth living, or what confers meaning on individual lives', writes Charles Taylor in Sources of the Self. 'This is an essentially modern predicament.' Charles Taylor's latest book sets out to define the modern identity by tracing its genesis, analysing the writings of such thinkers as Augustine, Descartes, Montaigne, Luther, and many others. This then serves as a starting point for a renewed understanding of modernity. Taylor argues that modern (...) subjectivity has its roots in ideas of human good, and is in fact the result of our long efforts to define and attain the good. The modern turn inwards is far from being a disastrous rejection of rationality, as its critics contend, but has at its heart what Taylor calls the affirmation of ordinary life. He concludes that the modern identity, and its attendant rejection of an objective order of reason, is far richer in moral sources that its detractors allow. Sources of the Self provides a decisive defence of the modern order and a sharp rebuff to its critics. (shrink)

We can gain fresh insights into aspects of criminal liability by focusing first on the prior topic of criminal responsibility, and on the relational dimensions of responsibility: responsibility is responsibility for something, to someone. We are criminally responsible as citizens, to our fellow citizens, for committing 'public' wrongs: I discuss the difficulty of giving determinate content to this idea of public wrongs, and the way in which, whereas moral responsibility is typically strict, criminal responsibility is not. Finally, I explore the (...) grounds on which defendants might deny that they are criminally responsible before the courts that seek to try them. (shrink)